China and the “Responsibilities” of a “Responsible” Power—The Uncertainties of Appropriate Power Rise Language

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This article looks at the ambiguities and tensions for and around the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in being “responsible” (fuzeren) and having “responsibilities” (zeren), both of which are related consequences surrounding its growing power (guo) in the international system and in the Asia-Pacific. However, the ambiguities surrounding the implications of being “responsible” and of having “responsibilities” cause problems not only for the international system but also for the PRC in terms of its image, and others’ reaction to the PRC. International and regional stability will be shaped by how far these aspects of power rise settle down in the PRC’s interaction and presence in the international system and in the Asia-Pacific.

Introduction

There is a challenging, complex and problematic process taking place in the full glare of international interest in China’s growing importance in international relations. Within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the question raised in recent years is simple and sustained; “one fundamental problem for China, a new rising power, is what role and identity it should take on the international stage?”¹ This reflects the current sense in the PRC of how with a “rising international status and with the fastest expansion of its global impact … China has moved from the fringes to the center of the world stage.”² As the PRC Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi, put it in his widely noticed speech at Munich Security Conference in February 2010; “how will China, a country ever growing and developing, interact with the rest of the world? And what role will China play on the international stage?” His sense was replete with power rise considerations; “a more developed China will undertake more international responsibilities ... share responsibilities ... That is why while focusing on its own development, China is undertaking more and more international responsibilities commensurate with its strength and status.” There is though uncertainty, a degree of hesitancy in the PRC over its sense and acknowledgement of its strength as a “Great Power” (da guo); as its leadership attempts to shape the best path, and indeed language, to use for its foreign policy. This is noticeable in discussions surrounding China’s use of the words being “responsible” (fuzeren) and having “responsibility” (zeren), which is what this article is concerned with; in which a “discourse of responsibility” can be seen from Chinese diplomats and politicians.

Within a rational choice matrix, the PRC’s basic interest is simple, clear and logical enough – ensuring continuing sustained economic growth and enrichment for the Chinese population, so as to stave off Tiananmen Square type of political demands for democratization and regime change. PRC leaderships under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao have been successful enough on that. The PRC’s economic growth has been sustained for three decades, with around 10% average growth each year since Deng initiated China’s Four Modernizations Programme in the late 1970s. This included China being affected less by the global recession of 2008–09, than was the case for Western developed countries, and recovering more quickly than they did. Normal service seemed to have been reinstated by the start of 2010 of 10% annual growth. This economics-driven success has though now brought sharpening questions over China’s international role, in which usage of “responsible” and “responsibilities” is a controversial issue.

In turn, these questions affect China’s public face. Its “public diplomacy” (gonggong waijiao) is partly a question of public policies; such as its pursuit of strategic partnerships (zhanlue huoban guanxi), its turn to multilateralism (duobian zhuyi), and its Good Neighborhood Policy (mulin yuhao zhengce). It is also a matter of language, the English language terms used by the PRC about itself, terms such as seeking “multipolarity” (duojihua) “democratization of international relations” (guoji guanxi mingzhuhua), “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) and “harmonious world” (hexie shijie). The deployment of such language is noticeable in government pronouncements. It is also noticeable in the varied official state controlled media outlets, the more so in their English language online counterparts; which serve as a doorway for the international system to look into China, as well as for China to project itself into and onto the international system.
A key context for China’s current diplomatic language has been the post-Cold War “chorus of China Threat” perceptions outside China. China remains acutely sensitive over the existence and impact of what it calls the “China Threat theory” (Zhongguo weixian lun); its worry that “recent years have already seen a growing clamor about ‘China threat,’ which, although groundless and absurd, could raise doubts about China.” China, in its own words, is “always haunted by the China Threat” image label, if (and when) held in the international system. The PRC aims to combat any likely China-threat perceptions, images and perceptions being the stamping ground of IR constructivism. Such a PRC sensitivity to image is for practical reasons, to avoid balance of threat dynamics (Stephen Walt style); in which other states having a perception of China’s “offensive intentions” (alongside Walt’s other elements of “aggregate power,” “offensive capabilities,” and “geographical proximity”), consequently group together against China. Instead, the PRC argues that a “stronger China poses no threat to other countries,” reassuring words that seeks to foster long term economics-driven Peaceful Rise by mid-century. PRC use of the words “responsible” and “responsibilities” reflect a further pragmatic instrumentalist approach to language, for very hard headed reasons, an approach that is acutely concerned with image projection, part of what can be called China’s “discourse power” (huayu quan).

The PRC’s approach to such international image appearance has been subject to subtle adjustments. Under Deng Xiaoping’s famous 24-character maxim, laid down in the 1990s, it was a question “be good at maintaining a low profile (shanyu shoutuo 善于守拙); never claim leadership (buyao dangtou 绝不当头).” A further gloss was added in the mid-1990s, “make some contributions/accomplish-do some things/strive for achievements” (yousou zuowei 绝不当头). This has dominated PRC Grand Strategy, keeping a low profile so as the shape a quiet environment for China to carry out long-term Economic Modernization. Treading quietly, treading slowly as it were.

At the 11th Ambassadorial Conference in 2009, debate took pace on Deng’s maxims, with the mid-1990s addition being adjusted to “actively getting something accomplished,” the addition of “actively” (jiji) a small, subtle but indicative adjustment of a more activist more noticeable profile for the PRC. The Conference also heard Hu Jintao’s Four Strengths call for the PRC to exert itself more within the international system with “more influential power in politics, more competitiveness in the economic field, more affinity in its image, more appealing force in morality.” This was followed up in late-November 2009 with Hu Jintao’s Viewpoints About the Times, which envisaged PRC foreign policy as operating under five drivers, namely “the profound changes [in the world situation], constructing a harmonious world, joint development, shared responsibilities, and enthusiastic participation [in global affairs].” PRC diplomacy is now set as “active diplomacy” (jiji waijiao); in which, as a rising major Power,
two interlinked questions arise for the PRC. Firstly: how far is China being “responsible” (reasonable) in its use of power, and how far is it “responsible” (the cause) for international problems. Secondly: what sort of “responsibilities” come with this rising power, both in terms of what China wants, and what the international system is ready to give? What is also noticeable is a gap between Chinese and outside perceptions on these matters, with ambiguity and tensions surrounding China’s usage.

**Being “responsible” (reasonable)**

In terms of jurisdictional fetters, China’s own hyper sense of sovereignty makes it reluctant to accept being responsible (i.e. legally constrained and thereby bound) to any outside body. Meanwhile, as its own power rises, China also becomes more able to reject outside interference, for want of a better term. However, China’s “going out” (zouchuqu) policy launched in 2001 by Jiang Zemin, its increasing multilateralism, and its embrace of globalisation has in practice also brought some Chinese acknowledgement of being responsible (i.e. paying heed) to some outside bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO), and more vaguely to the international community. This is all part and parcel of China’s message of being a responsive and “responsible state” within the international system; “its current diplomatic strategy-to play a responsible role on the world stage.”

In paying heed to outside concerns and sensibilities, China is certainly now asserting its message, and image, of reasonableness through using the “responsible” (fuzeren) term, “China as a responsible and constructive player” in the international system. At times this usage can be through the term “responsible Great Power” (fuzeren da guo). At other times, PRC’s talk of being a “responsible Great Power” has become nudged into more frequent official talk of China being a “responsible big nation” or a “big responsible country.”

Partly this responsible = reasonable usage is to avoid overt confrontation with the US and to suggest a general support for international stability of the Asia-Pacific and international system; “China has not adopted the approach of challenging the hegemony and world order for its rise and has sought to be a responsible country within the current international system.” It stresses a Good Neighborhood Policy (mulin youhao zhengce) for the Asia-Pacific generally. In terms of acting like a “responsible” power, China can and does point out some Security Council cooperation with the USA over North Korea, involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor and elsewhere, and a degree of distancing herself from some regimes in Zimbabwe, Myanmar and the Sudan. China has been cooperating in G8 and G20 forums, in her own words, as “a responsible member of the international community.” In joining the WTO, it was a question for Hu Jintao that “China is a responsible nation. Once entering the WTO, we will earnestly fulfil our rights and obligations.” Such entry was
used to argue that “China’s economy had integrated into the world economy in all aspects as a responsible member.”

In a positive light China could, and did, argue that it was acting positively “as a responsible member” of the international community during the financial depression that hit the world in 2008. Wen Jiabao’s rhetoric at the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum meeting was that “as a big responsible country, China has acted in an active and responsible way during this crisis. We mainly rely on expanding effective domestic demand, particularly consumer demand, to boost economic growth,” and thus re-stimulate the global economy. Such positive affirmations of China’s responsible actions have been reiterated elsewhere in the PRC; “China has behaved as a responsible power in this crisis,” in which it has “duly undertaken its international responsibility and obligation, taken part actively in international cooperation to fight the crisis, promoted the reform of the international financial system, coordinated its macroeconomic policies with other economies, and driven the economic recovery of the world together with the international community.” Similar language was used for China’s role in climate change negotiations leading up to the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009, whereby “China, being a responsible member of the global community, will contribute its fair share in battling climate change.” Of course, what a “fair share” might be in terms of derived responsibilities is a moot point. PRC measures in all of those fields, and what the PRC considers to be a “fair share,” may not be going as far as others would wish, but China can maintain that expectations are too much from the outside.

Robert Zoellick’s famous call as Deputy Secretary of State in September 21, 2005, in his speech “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” was for China to act as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. Four years on, and the call remained that the US “encourages China to participate responsibly in world affairs by taking on a greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system.” China’s response has been to accept the term, but on China’s own terms, perhaps responsibleness with Chinese characteristics! For the PRC, the “responsible stakeholder” term not only “helps alleviate the wave of ‘China threat,’” but also implies stakeholder rights in shaping the rules of the system. It is something embedded within the UN; the “obligation toward becoming a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and playing a larger role in international entities such as the UN. The country’s active participation in UN peacekeeping missions not only demonstrates its support for the UN, but is also an embodiment of the fulfilment of its obligations as a major world power.” The term “responsible” can also be used by the PRC as an implied contrast with irresponsible Great Power behaviour from the United States, with US protectionism attracting the label “irresponsible stakeholder” from the PRC. At other times, the more positive use of the concept can be to
suggest a crucial equality of status with the US, with the PRC’s coupling of “responsible stakeholders and constructive partners” vis-à-vis the US. Not only does the PRC use the phrase “responsible big nation,” it also reinforces by arguing that this indeed represents a “reasonable” attitude from the PRC, in other words contrasting this with unreasonable irresponsible big nation attitudes by other states.

Military matters can though present an ambiguous picture. Talk from the PRC that “in accord with China’s status as a responsible nation, the PLA will carry out more [military] exercises with more countries in more fields” may be a sign of bilateral and multilateral cooperation for the parties involved, yet can be a disturbing sign for other countries not involved. Rear Admiral Yang Yi argued that “as a responsible great power . . . China should make greater contributions to the international community. Therefore, it needs to build a powerful military that is commensurate with its international position.” Yet, combining such powerful military projection with restraint is problematic. The participation of the missile destroyer Guangzhou in the multilateral AMAN 2009 operations in the Arabian Sea was explained by Admiral Li Ping in perhaps ambiguous three-fold terms: “first, a grander image of the Chinese navy . . . will be presented through the exercise. Second, China is a responsible country in maintaining regional and international security and stability . . . Third, it will help the Chinese navy ‘go global,’” in what he argued was a reassuring setting. The PRC may argue that “big” does not necessarily mean threatening, thanks to the “responsible” jacket that China dons; a “stronger China poses no threat to other nations . . . China is a big country, and a responsible one. Therefore, it needs a military strength matching its status as a big country. This is dictated by the need to safeguard China’s own security and protect the country’s national interests.” However, such military strengthening is precisely what China’s neighbors like South Korea, Japan and India remain concerned about, concerns that are reflected in negative opinion poll images there of China’s military growth. PRC talk that “China is a responsible nation in terms of maintaining world peace and managing world affairs” can cause disquiet amongst other members of the international system concerned about China managing world affairs.

A standard line advanced by Tang Shiping has been that “a more self-confident China will be a responsible power with its growing strength. By that we mean that China will continue to develop its comprehensive national power, but will exercise its power with self-restraint. While we cannot be absolutely sure China’s benign behavior will continue, we can say with great confidence that this more likely than not.” The trouble is that there is not necessarily such a “great confidence” in the PRC, for uncertainties about China’s intentions remains an important issue for other countries. PRC writers may be arguing that that a “more self-confident China will be a responsible Power,” but that is not
necessarily self-evident; a more confident China could merely be a more impinging pushing China.

**Being “responsible” (causing)**

Being “responsible” can also mean China being the cause, primarily, of problems in the international system. For China, generally being pinpointed as the cause of problems has two adverse consequences. Firstly, it damages the PRC’s image as a supportive rather than destructive element in the international system, and cuts across its whole rhetoric of *win-win* diplomacy and a *harmonious world* atmosphere. It can make China look bad, no small consideration for an “image-conscious China.” Secondly, it can cause the problem of the PRC being expected to thereby solve the problem it has supposedly caused, through liability being attached, with financial costs thereon. Two issues have been the focus for particular outside “responsibility” concerns and PRC rebuttals, first the global recession that swept around the world in 2008–2009, and secondly the seeming debacle at the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change in December 2009.

With regard to the global recession that swept around the world during 2008–09, it was initially brought to public eye with the collapse of various banks in the USA (and in turn elsewhere in the West) who had overextended themselves in lending to the subprime, doubtful lending market that quickly became bad debt as defaults mounted on them. Government bailouts were the norm in the West, along with slumping trade and job layoffs. In that setting, the bankers became the first obvious target, especially given their ongoing readiness to award themselves big bonuses, for what would indeed seem failure on a catastrophic scale. That is another story though. One side effect of this was that the allure of the Western financial model, indeed of the West itself, was damaged not only in the PRC but also in much of the non-Western World. Conversely China’s success in quickly stimulating its economic in early 2009, and its resumption of high rates of economic growth, 10.7% in the last quarter of 2009, raised its profile, and for many African and Latin American countries it increased some the allure of the so-called *Beijing Consensus*.

As the West floundered in its more drawn out economic recession, sharp questions were raised about China’s role as a deeper cause, “while most of the impact of emerging economies is benign, that cannot be said for China. Some economists say its emergence on to the world stage brought with it a key reason for the global economic meltdown between 2007 and 2009,” allegations that the PRC quickly responded to. The argument is that the readiness of US banks to get into the dodgy mortgages business was only because they had liquid finance. Quite simply, the finger for this was pointed at the PRC, given China’s soaring foreign exchange reserves, mostly in US dollar assets, which had poured into the USA during the first decade of the century. The problem for China was that
the consequences of China being seen as ultimately responsible for the global recession was that China was being exhort ed to reduce its financial surpluses, through reducing its exports (which had been generating such excess liquidity in the international banking system), and diverting savings and investments into its home market, thereby increasing import demand for Western goods and decreasing China’s export led surpluses.

Not unsurprisingly, the PRC’s public diplomacy rebuttal machinery was quickly launched and sustained; a feature generally in countering any perceived “China Threat theory” manifestations. Some of China’s rebuttals had some merit to them, as the US had been happy enough before the slump to accept incoming Chinese finance, and nobody forced banks to lend on doubtful subprime mortgages, least of all other countries like China that were on the other side of the globe. Beijing could well argue that doubtful subprime lending was the banks’ decisions, and as such they were not responsible for how Western banks chose to operate. Beijing’s line was that “the current crisis obviously originated in developed countries in the West, but these economists laid the blame on other countries rather than on their own.”44 Given its argument about an irresponsible Western banking system; emerging PRC fifth generation leaders like Li Keqiang have argued at venues like the Davos World Economic Forum for the need to “develop a more fair and efficient structure of global governance that reflects changes in the global political and economic landscape;” in which “the constructive role of the G20 should be given a better play” alongside the “need to reform international financial institutions” like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).45

The other big issue where China was held to be responsible for causing problems was with climate change in general, and carbon dioxide emissions in particular, where China overtook the US as the biggest carbon dioxide emitter in 2008. China’s position was in effect to redirect the blame for the problem. Wen Jiabao argued in December 2009 that “developed countries account for 80% of the total global carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago. If we all agree that carbon dioxide emissions are the direct cause for climate change, then it is all too clear who should take the primary responsibility,” the West and Japan, not China.46 This involved financial transfers, “developed countries bear the historical responsibility [i.e. were responsible/ caused] for climate change and should provide compensation for that.”47

As to the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, in December 2009, expectations were high on a clear cut and inclusive legally-binding Treaty emerging from it, that would see the US and China forge a new framework for dealing with the climate change challenge. In the event, the Conference descended into muffled sessions, hurried ad-hoc meetings, and eventual failure of any binding Treaty to emerge. China was heavily criticised in the West as having led the coalition of developing nations, and by blocking moves for high
emission-reduction targets to at least be fixed for Western countries.\textsuperscript{48} China’s response was again clear-cut rebuttal, rejection and counter-attack over such criticisms of being responsible for Copenhagen failure.\textsuperscript{49} Instead responsibility (cause $\sim >$ blame) lay on the West. With regard to the Conference, responsibility for its shortcomings was laid at the US door, “the US president as an active obstacle to a real agreement – alienating the Chinese with a demand for inspections.”\textsuperscript{50} Different reasonable/unreasonable labels were attached to China and the Developed (West and Japan) countries. On the one hand, “China has made a reasonable compromise by accepting a provision requiring developing countries to report every two years on their voluntary actions,” on the other hand “without explicit commitments of financial assistance and technological transfers from rich nations, the developing world would find it unreasonable to accept external monitoring and verification of their greenhouse-gas emissions efforts.”\textsuperscript{51} Talk of financial assistance and technologies takes us into the question of “responsibilities” expected from China by the international system, and expected by China from the international system.

\textbf{Having “responsibilities”}

Consideration of being “responsible” leads to consideration of \textit{Zhongguo de da guo zeren} “China’s Responsibilities as a Great Power.” This reflects Hedley Bull’s imperatives, but also ambiguities, surrounding international expectations placed on a Great Power who “cannot ignore these demands . . . its freedom of maneuver is circumscribed by ‘responsibility’.”\textsuperscript{52} The old adage that with power comes responsibility, can thus be pushed further by asking with more power does there come more responsibility, or responsibilities (\textit{zeren}), for the PRC?\textsuperscript{53} PRC commentators like Yan Xuetong talk of how “in the spirit of ‘performing great deeds’ China has decided to take responsibilities of a big nation.”\textsuperscript{54} The PRC official media have also advanced this linkage; that “when we see and feel the glory of advancing toward a big power . . . we are bound to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations . . . To be a big power is not only a question of international status and reputation, but also an issue of international responsibility and obligations.”\textsuperscript{55} Such talk of shouldering responsibilities suggests a suitable reluctance on China’s part, of being asked by the international community to take on such burdens for the common international good.\textsuperscript{56} Talk about this shouldering of responsibilities is still carefully shaped, “a series of active measures to shoulder responsibility in accordance with its capability, drawing widespread attention from the international community,” in which the qualificatory clause “in accordance with its capability” is noticeable enough.\textsuperscript{57}

In 2010, it was clear enough for China’s Minster of Foreign affairs Yang Jiechi that:
A more developed China will undertake more international responsibilities and will
never pursue self interests at the expense of the interests of others . . . Our own inter-
ests and those of others are best served when we work together to expand common
interests, share responsibilities and seek win-win outcomes. That is why while
focusing on its own development, China is undertaking more and more inter-
national responsibilities commensurate with its strength and status.58

Obviously one could question the talk of “never” pursuing self interest at the
expense of others, but nevertheless what is significant is the repetition, three
times in quick succession of the word “responsibilities,” especially the talk of
its applicable “more and more” by China.

Admittedly, there are PRC figures like Gao Zugui who argue that China’s still
developing stage means China has less international responsibilities to maintain,
“China should not shoulder more international responsibility and commitment
than her capability to do so allows.”59 In the Beijing Review, criticisms were
raised over the West “asking China to shoulder the responsibility as ‘a big
power.’ Together with other developing countries, China has the right to
develop. To ask China to undertake excessive responsibilities in terms of resource
conservation and environmental protection as ‘a big power’ will hamper the coun-
try’s development,” and so should be resisted by the PRC.60 In the summer of
2009, this argument was being advanced in the Global Times that “misperception
of China as a great power has also led many foreign countries to seek to saddle
China with a great deal of responsibility in handling international issues;” but
“the country’s [external] capability at present is limited. China’s focus for now
must [instead] lie in maintaining its steady [internal] development.”61 At the
least it was a question for the Global Times in 2010 that the PRC should
“manage world’s rising expectations” over its responsibilities.62

A dilemma affects current Chinese policy, Suisheng Zhao’s “defining tension
in Chinese foreign policy agenda” to find a balance “between expanding China’s
international influence and taking more responsibility on the one hand and conti-
ufuing to play down its pretense to being a global power and avoiding confronta-
tion with the US on the other hand.”63 One PRC variant has to stress how there are
“common responsibilities” rather than just responsibilities placed on China.64
However, Hu Jintao’s sense in summer 2009 that “as two countries with signifi-
cant influence in the world . . . China and the United States shoulder important
responsibilities on a host of major issues concerning peace and development of
mankind” can be seen as a way of suggesting equality of status with the US; but
also, with its duopoly undertones of Chinamerica or a de facto G-2, being
something that other states could feel left out of?65 The Chinese Foreign Minister
may have argued that “the strategic foundation of China-US relations lies in our
major and unique responsibility of maintaining world peace and stability” but
again this is potentially divisive vis-à-vis other states like India and Japan who are marginalized under such a duopoly.66

By and large the PRC does use the language of “international responsibility” and responsibilities much more, with several reasons given.67 In part, such language structurally reflects China’s general power profile, “with its fast development and rapid rise in its international status, China has been assuming its global responsibility and obligations consonant with its actual status in a positive, responsible approach,” entwining responsibleness with responsibilities.68 This underpinned discussion of China’s involvement in the nuclear safety summit in April 2010; “as a nation with great influence on the international stage, China cannot escape the responsibility of maintaining international peace and stability. It should play a significant role in the global nuclear summit . . . This is a necessary requirement for a responsible country like China.”69

This reflects economic-driven capacity, “with its economy booming, China has substantially more resources to allocate for sharing responsibility with the international community,” and for maintaining its interests.70 China’s responsibilities are also linked to its international institutional position, its Great Power position in the UN, whereby “as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China should of course carry out the responsibilities that come with that status.”71 Given China’s continued hyper-sensitivity over sovereignty, this insistence on UN authorisation, in which China has a veto to protect its own interests, is an avenue within which China’s acceptance may develop of the “responsibility to intervene” humanitarian doctrine, a doctrine itself first adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005.72 Responsibility can also facilitate greater status for China; shown in talk of mutually advantageous environmental cooperation in which “by embracing this responsibility, China can gain recognition as a full partner in one of the most important global efforts in human history, while also ensuring it has a seat at the table.”73 China can also talk of its developmental responsibilities; “China has always been and will continue to be a positive force for world peace and common development. As a responsible and major developing country, China has always made common development an important aspect of its foreign policy.”74

With regard to global warming, China can argue that it has been the West, and especially the US, that has been most responsible (causally) for these trends, and that it is the West, and especially the US that thereby has the greater responsibility (duties) for sorting these problems out, with China thereby having fewer responsibilities to meet. As Hu Jintao argued at the UN Climate Summit, “developed countries should take up their responsibility and provide new, additional, adequate and predictable financial support to developing countries to enable them to have access to climate-friendly technologies.”75 This was the setting for the continuing PRC refrain of common but differentiated responsibilities in this environmental...
In other words, “due responsibilities;” in which “conditions were not yet ripe for China, still a developing country, to make quantified emission reduction commitments, or to specify when its emissions might peak at the current stage.” With regard to the global recession that swept around the world in 2008–09, China also diverts responsibilities onto others. Premier Wen Jiabao argued at the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum that “developed countries in particular, should assume due responsibilities and obligations to minimize the damage caused by the international financial crisis on developing countries.” Similar diversion of responsibilities was also a feature with economic development policies, that “the developed countries in particular, should shoulder their due responsibilities and obligations and fulfil their commitment of providing assistance and reducing debts.”

However problems of language and image remain. Talk amidst naval deployment into the Gulf of Aden in 2008 that “China is a responsible member of the international community and shoulders the responsibilities of maintaining peace and stability in the region and the world at large,” can still cause problems for other neighboring countries that may have worries precisely over Chinese shoul-dering such responsibilities. As with being “responsible,” shouldering “respon-sibilities” can have ambiguous military nuances, if not for the PRC then at least for the outside world. The PRC can be blunt enough about this trend. Take for example this Global Times piece:

The expansion of Chinese interests overseas has required that long-distance military deployment capability be strengthened ... As a rising power expected to take more responsibility, Chinese military force needs to be commensurate with China’s growing role in the international community ... This ability is critical for a truly modern military and necessary for a strong power.

The military power and responsibilities can work in either direction for China. In one direction of this power ⇔ responsibilities relationship, it is a question that “the development of China’s navy ... is a natural result of the growth of China’s overall power as well as the increase of China’s international responsibilities;” whilst in the other direction, it is argued in the PRC that “if it wants to take up more responsibilities, it needs more strength to back it up. The strength we are talking about here includes a country’s national defense power.”

Image considerations?

Outside perceptions, images, of China remain a central concern for the PRC, the “Chinese political elite understand the imperative of cultivating the image of a responsible player” in the international system. PRC commentators admit this surrounds “China’s self-identity construction as a responsible Great Power” (Leng zhan hou zhong guo fuze ren da guo). Given the sensitivity
over any China-Threat perceptions, it is not surprising that the PRC sees its own advocacy of appropriate regional responsibilities as combating such perceptions; “China being a big country which is creating a new diplomatic image and undertaking regional responsibility,” in which “to undertake greater international responsibilities is a useful way to eliminate the ‘China threat’ fallacy, and to upgrade China’s image internationally.” Instrumentalist perceptual undertones continually surround official statements of a drive to “shape the Image of Responsible Big Nation.” Consequently, “China conveys an image of a responsible big country,” with public diplomacy language actively and deliberately deployed during this past decade to “build up an image of a responsible big country.”

Image considerations continue to emerge around specific PRC policies. Thus, for the People’s Daily, anti-drug cooperation was something showing “China’s responsible image.” At the Navy Military Academy, Li Jie reckoned that China’s Gulf of Aden deployment in 2009 “fully displayed and enhanced China’s image as a responsible power.” China’s deployment of naval forces to the Gulf of Aden in December 2008 certainly showcased China’s growing power projection capabilities; but also brought People’s Daily headlines of “China to bolster image as responsible big nation;” with Rear Admiral Xiao Xinnian, the PLAN deputy chief of staff, arguing that the naval deployment “showcased China’s positive attitude in fulfilling its international obligations and the country’s image as a responsible power.” Such perceptual considerations also underpin the Sino-Russian relationship, described in the People’s Daily as China showing “the image of responsible big nation.”

Similarly, global economic cooperation was described in 2009 as something enabling “China to bolster image as responsible big nation.” As to gradual moves by the PRC towards accepting some responsibility to protect applications in Rwanda, Kosovo and Darfur; Chengqiu Wu acknowledges “drawing on constructivist international relations theory” to argue that “having undergone in recent years an identity change from a defensive power of bitterness and insecurity to a rising power aspiring to take more responsibility, China is more concerned about its national image and more receptive to international norms, which has led to the changes in its response to [these] international humanitarian crises.” The question arises of how effective has such image-related usage of “responsible” and “responsibilities” been?

During the past few years the PGAS Pew Global Attitudes Survey has tracked China’s positive enough image in Africa and some parts of Asia; but it has also tracked continuing, and in some cases increasingly, negative images of China’s military and economic rise elsewhere. Broadly speaking, this can be looked at during the period 2002–2009 (Table 1).

The favourability score refers to the PRC government, with favourability scores towards the Chinese people being higher in general. With regard to the
PRC government, a general deterioration can be seen; except for much of Africa, where the soft power attractiveness of the Beijing Consensus seems at play in China’s development assistance without human rights/sovereignty strings. Volatility is apparent with regard to US opinion. However, elsewhere, attitudes towards the PRC have deteriorated during the past decade, especially in Europe (including Russia), and in China’s neighbors like South Korea, Japan, India and Indonesia.95

China’s problems in handling power give rise to continuing image problems. This underpinned warnings in 2009 by Yan Lieshan, a columnist for Southern Weekend, on what he felt to be a dangerous gap in perceptions between China and the rest of the world, over China’s international presence.96 After all, the People’s Daily editor Li Hongmei also admitted in 2009 that “China has yet to present itself as constructive and trustworthy enough to its neighborhood,” for “what is striking the nerves of the neighboring states is nothing more than where China’s future development is pointing to.”97 The following year, 2010, she was still arguing for “Public Relations (PR) strategies ... to revamp China’s international image.”98

Image problems can be followed with regard to China’s growing military power and economic power (Table 2); where the former attracts more concerns than the latter, but with an overall pattern of European concerns that include Russia vis-à-vis China.99

From China’s point of view she will have some concerns about some of these figures. Already Russia has refused to transfer certain high tech advanced weapons to China, whilst being ready to sell them to India, despite China being Russia’s strategic partner. How firm a partner is Russia likely to prove in future years for China, given such rising military worries apparent in Russian circles about

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</thead>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>−13</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>−17</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>−17</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>63</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>68</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>−10</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>+26</td>
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China’s growing power, and muted concerns over Chinese penetration into the Russian Far East? A disturbing scenario for China would be containment around her by Asian neighbors like India and Japan along with the United States, the “crescent-shaped ring of encirclement” nightmare currently discerned by some PRC strategists. Such nightmare scenarios give an extra push to PRC assurance diplomacy use of “responsible” and “responsibilities” emphasis by China would seem a matter of buying time. PRC eyes are still looking forward, “it will take the strenuous efforts of several and even a dozen generations before China can truly achieve modernization. To enable the 1.3 billion people to live a comfortable life, we must focus all our time and energy

<table>
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<th>June 2008</th>
<th>PRC growing military power (+/− = 2007 comparison)</th>
<th>PRC growing economic power</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good thing</td>
<td>Bad thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>82 (+14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>74 (+8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>81 (+4)</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>77 (+7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>61</td>
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Conclusions

China is probably coping well enough with the challenges and dilemmas surrounding its own growing power and external responses to that growing power. Hard line explicit-specific containment alliances against the PRC have so far been avoided. China has toned down, sidelined and shelved most confrontational situations; whilst successfully taking on more responsibilities in a generally responsible cooperative manner, though a growing confidence could tip into a growing assertiveness that becomes less cooperative. Such responsible/responsibilities emphasis by China would seem a matter of buying time. PRC eyes are still looking forward, “it will take the strenuous efforts of several and even a dozen generations before China can truly achieve modernization. To enable the 1.3 billion people to live a comfortable life, we must focus all our time and energy...
on development. We will seek a peaceful international environment to develop ourselves.”¹⁰¹ Within this longer-term setting, there has been talk of this present decade being a crucial window of “strategic opportunity” for China to establish decisive and irreversible economic breakthrough, the prerequisite for modernisation and her hopes for Peaceful Rise by mid-century. As Wen Jiabao noted at Davos in 2009, “our confidence comes from the fact that the long-term trend of China’s economic development remains unchanged. We are in an important period of strategic opportunities.”¹⁰² China’s confidence may though exacerbate other countries’ uncertainties about China; for there remains the problem that there is continuing perception by others that China’s intentions remain uncertain and potentially troublesome.¹⁰³ This was why the New York Times argued in February 2010 that “it is s right to press Beijing to behave more responsibly—toward its own people and internationally. China is certainly pushing its sense of grievance too far and underestimating the fear and resentment its growing power is provoking in Asia and the West;” a critique quickly picked up and commented upon in the Global Times, with its own article ‘China and US must learn to walk in each other’s shoes,’ in effect putting each other through the eyes, and perceptions of the other, rather than “one country trying to tell the other one what to do.”¹⁰⁴

The PRC has indeed projected its public diplomacy through reassurance language, and a careful use of the words “responsible” and “responsibilities.” Such rhetoric is probably genuine enough; after all what country would not want to peacefully rise rather than have to fight for it? But it remains true that current rhetoric and policies at the start of the century do not, and cannot in political reality, commit or bind a Chinese government in mid-century to future actions then. Avery Goldstein correctly reckons that China’s current policy of cooperative engagement with the world remains inherently a “strategy of transition,” one that “finesses questions about the longer term;” since “it is not designed to guide China once it has risen and circumstances are fundamentally different” in the latter decades of the 21st century.¹⁰⁵ The PRC continues to proclaim that it will never use its rising power for threatening hegemonic ways, that it will be a responsible (reasonable) actor carrying out increasing responsibilities in a non-threatening way. However, the problem is that a deceitful long-term threatening actor, as well as a long-term benign actor, would use such language; the former to lull potential opponents into a state of strategic slumber, and the latter as a genuine flagging of intentions.

Meanwhile there remain ambiguities over where the PRC sees its position and positioning within the international system. Is the PRC primarily taking on the responsibility as the representative of developing countries, as argued at the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009? Is the PRC more seeing itself as one of the big “new emerging powers” (xinxing daguo) in the shape of the
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) formation? Is the PRC focus on cooperating with the US as a G8 power? The push by the PRC for G20 enhancement seems a way of straddling these avenues?

Amidst such uncertainties and permutations, two trends are discernible. On the one hand, China is successfully buying itself time to continue and conclude its long-term modernisation programme, amidst increasing responsibilities taken on by China and given by the international system. Such responsibilities may indeed lead to short-term time-buying instrumentalist motives on China’s part giving way to longer-term normative changes, the international socialisation of China argument; the gradual acceptance of international (i.e. liberal) norms by the PRC, and subsequently the transferral of these norms into its domestic settings. Globalisation continues, and with it growing economic interdependence, graphically shown in the current US-China synchronisation and coordination of policy to deal with the economic downturn and long-term climate change issues. However, there remains continuing, one could argue inevitable, inherent reluctance by other major actor actors to “just” engage with China. They wish to keep their options open. China’s rising power cannot but be noticed by others, and with it the inevitable unknowability now in 2010 for what the situation really will be like around 2040–50 with a China that has completed its modernisation programme, and had achieved power rise of the first order. Faced with that fundamental unknowability, what China is faced with is widespread ongoing strategic and military “hedging” by other significant powers, including the US in the western Pacific as well as Japan and India, towards its clear rising power.

Such hedging means that, despite whatever language and policies China takes in terms of carrying out more responsibilities in a responsible manner, it is almost inevitably still going to be faced with countries pursuing engagement with the PRC along with military strengthening (internal balancing) and cooperative understandings that are not explicit containment (hard balancing/offensive realism) of China but which nevertheless bring countries together who have shared concerns about “possible” China problems (softer balancing?). This engagement-continuance and containment-avoidance seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Would such hedging by others, despite China’s being responsible in carrying out more responsibilities, represent failure for China? For a benign (democratic or not) China, such an outcome of hedging by other states would not represent failure over PRC use of responsible/responsibilities language; since balancing elements by others will merely turn out to be insurance policies by other countries against a China Threat scenario that has not arisen. On the other hand, for any Chinese “Middle Kingdom” aspirations on regional hegemony, under Communist Party or other style government, strategic hedging by others would represent the failure of such responsible-responsibilities rhetoric by the PRC. The future will see.
Notes


8 All these hard copy publications have had their web-faces created in recent years. *Xinhua* (http://www.xinhuanet.com) is an institution of the State Council of China operating as an official state news agency for international announcements. The *People’s Daily* (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/) is the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party and has *Global Times* (http://www.globaltimes.cn/) as its own, more robust, offshoot. The *PLA Daily* (“China Military Online” a “window on China’s Armed Forces, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/) operates as the official mouthpiece for the armed forces. The *China Daily* (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/) and the weekly *Beijing Review* (http://www.bjreview.com.cn/) operate as an interface between state, think tanks, Chinese academics and some selected acceptable foreign voices. They are though fairly interchangeable, often carrying each others reports, with Government announcements displayed on all of them at times.

9 Yong Deng, *China’s Struggle for Status* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 104.


The whole maxim also included the controversial line, “hide our capacities and bide our time (taoguang yanghui 避光养晦), but that is another story! In the People’s Daily, “U.S. Report Intentionally Creates Misunderstanding,” 26 May 2006, stress was laid on how “one will see “never claim leadership” is the core of China’s strategy for development.”


Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New


28 “The “China Answer” to the Crisis,” China Daily, 7 January 2010.


“Climate Deal Falls Short.”

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London; Macmillan, 1977), 229; pinpointing “demands for the poor countries” for economic justice, nuclear justice and racial justice, which “all have to be accommodated within the great powers” scheme of policy. A great power hoping to be accepted as a legitimate managerial power cannot ignore these demands,” in which “at least the motions have to be gone through of seeking to meet them,” 229.


China and the “Responsibilities” of a “Responsible” Power


64 Yuan, “Common Responsibilities of “Stakeholders.”


69 Zhao, “China Cannot be Absent at Imminent Nuclear Safety Summit”.


75 Hu Jintao, “Statement by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People’s

“‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ Must Never be Compromised,” Xinhua, 18 December 2009.

“China to Shoulder Due Responsibilities in Countering Climate Change,” Xinhua, 23 October 2009.


“President Hu Jintao’s Attendance at the Second Financial Summit of G20 Leaders Achieves Major Outcomes,” 4 April 2009.


“Build an Army that Suits Modern Conditions,” Global Times, 12 August 2009.


“Jointly Shape the Image of Responsible Big Nation,” People’s Daily, 5 July 2005.


“China to Bolster Image as Responsible Big Nation,” *People’s Daily*, 31 March 2009.


Qin Jize and Li Xiaokun, “China Circed by Chain of US Anti-missile Systems,” *China Daily*, 22 February 2010. It was no coincidence that the PRC *Global Times* poll on “Dangerous Countries” countries, carried out in August 2009, had the main entries as these three states; Japan at 29.78%, India at 28.65% and the US at 23.60%, all far in advance of the next entry of Iran at 6.18% and of course China at a miniscule 1.69%. Global Times, “Which Country Do You Think is the Most Dangerous One in the World?” 11 August 2009. See PRC concerns in “Washington Draws India in Against China,” *People’s Daily*, 7 July 2005; Jiang Xinfeng, “US-Japan Alliance


About the author

David Scott, PhD, currently delivers the Asia-Pacific side of the International Relations programme at Brunel University, with particular reference to the rise of China, and the rise of India. In recent years, his articles on China’s and India’s role in the international system have appeared in journals like *Asia Europe Journal, Asian Security, Asia-Pacific Review, Geopolitics, India Review, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Journal of World-Systems Research, International Studies,* and *International Relations.* Three books he wrote, a trilogy, have been published on China’s role in the international system, namely: ‘The Chinese Century’? The Challenge to Global order (Palgrave, 2008); ‘China Stands Up’: The PRC and the Modern International System (Routledge, 2007); and China and the International System, 1840–1949: Power, Presence and Perceptions in a ‘Century of Humiliation,’ (SUNY, 2008). The author can be contacted at david.scott@brunel.ac.uk