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# India's relations with Pakistan

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### Introduction

Of all India's relations, that with Pakistan has been the most problematic and highly charged, over the longest period of time, a relationship accurately described by Inder Gujral as a 'tormented' one.<sup>1</sup> Such has been this ongoing, generally negative relationship that for each country the other now looms large as something of an existential bogeyman, the 'Other'. Even as India looks beyond South Asia in its international rise, relations with Pakistan continue to remain embedded like a thorn in India's foreign policy, both within its *immediate neighbourhood*, and also in India's *extended neighbourhood*. An 'unending' tension and conflict has characterized their relationship as neighbouring independent states.<sup>2</sup>

An initial moment in time illustrates this well, namely the Simla Agreement, drawn up in July 1972 in the aftermath of yet another war between these two neighbours.<sup>3</sup> This came a quarter of a century after their emergence as independent successor states to British India. The Agreement's preamble asserted that 'The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent'. To talk of conflict and confrontation as having marred their relations was indeed accurate. Unfortunately, a friendly and harmonious relationship had failed to operate before 1972, but equally well has also failed to establish itself since 1972.

Within the Simla Agreement some technical details were established over the return of Prisoners of War, but little else. It stated that 'the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them'. Their differences have not been resolved. The Simla Agreement talked of how 'the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means', but those basic issues and causes of conflict still remain pretty intact, unresolved by peaceful or indeed non-peaceful means. Within that range of issues, the Agreement talked of working to bring about 'a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir', but almost 40 years on, the issue of Kashmir remains a confrontational bone of contention between them.

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Meanwhile, the Simla Agreement talked of interim measures, of a practical *modus vivendi*: ‘both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other’, a still-born piece of rhetoric. The Agreement may have expressed the hope that ‘pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations’, but each side accuses the other of detrimental acts and encouragement of hostile forces. The Agreement may have asserted that ‘the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs’, yet interference and destabilization continued to be perceived by each against the other. Pakistan accuses India of supporting Baluchi separatism; India accuses Pakistan of supporting Kashmir *jihadi* breakaway groups.

The Simla Agreement talked of ‘basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years’. These basic issues and causes of conflict can be organized into the following: national identity, Kashmir, terrorism, strategic culture and the legacy of war, missile–nuclear arms race, wider alliances, and economic linkages. Three Pakistan levels are involved, the role of Pakistan’s governments, the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the role of Pakistan-based *jihadi* groups.

## National identity

One of the interesting things in international relations has been the way in which perceptions of culture and identity have indeed returned to the front of international relations analysis.<sup>4</sup> 22 February 1941 was a fateful day in the history of British India and for the future shape of the sub-continent. On that day the force of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s ‘two-nation theory’ took decisive shape with the Lahore Declaration, the formal call by the Muslim League for Partition: ‘the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’. In bald terms, this led to the creation of Pakistan, divided into two wings, West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

The rationale for this was the two-nation theory propounded vigorously by Jinnah, whose forceful personality and determination played a key part in getting this, and hence being called the *Quaid-I Azam* ‘Father of the Nation’. In this case, his sense of nation was religiously based, even if his personal life was not, namely Islam.

It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality and this misconception of one Indian nation lies gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions [...] To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.<sup>5</sup>

Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilization* thesis had indeed been predated in this analysis by Jinnah half a century earlier, a ‘fractured fraternity’ predating Huntington’s ‘fracture lines of

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conflict'.<sup>6</sup> In successfully pushing through this vision of religious-cum-political division, the question then arose as to what legacy such nation-formation has had on the two successor states, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the (secular) Republic of India.

The irony is that Jinnah seemed to think that dividing India up on different nation grounds would not damage subsequent inter-nation relations between two such diametrically created states:

The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such [...] There is no reason why these states should be antagonistic to secure to each other [...] It will lead more towards natural good will by international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to Minorities by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and affectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and various other Minorities.<sup>7</sup>

However, this has most certainly not been the case. For over half a century these two neighbours emerging from British India have polarized the subcontinent and taken their arguments against each other inside *and* outside the region.

Part of the legacy has been the reverberating effects of the political polemics surrounding Partition, and the very tangible human suffering caused as Partition was implemented on the ground amidst population transfers and sectarian killings on a significant scale during that summer of 1947. In terms of national psyche, this historical memory is still strong.

In addition, there is a political legacy. The problem has been that the political foundations of the one challenge the very foundations and legitimacy of the other, through being based on diametrically opposite principles. On the one hand stands Pakistan, the very case for political independence of which is based on a sense of nationalism based on religious allegiance. Without religion, Pakistan made no sense, especially in its split geographical position between East and West Pakistan. Islam was the ideological glue used to justify its very national existence, based on the claim that Hindus and Muslims could not get along in a common national framework. On the other hand the Republic of India rejected the very foundations of the two-nation theory, refusing to see itself a Hindu India, it proclaimed and rejoiced in religious pluralism underpinned by a secular political underpinning for the state and for a geographical sense of what India was. India's secular-political claims cut across and in a way continue to undermine Pakistan's legitimacy, whilst Pakistan's religious-political claims cut across and in a way continue to undermine India's secular legitimacy. In effect, 'the underlying basis of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is really an argument about the fundamentals of state-construction', an argument over 'primordial conceptions of identity' that continues to shape antagonistic inter-state relations vis-à-vis each other.<sup>8</sup>

The reverberations of this have continued down the decades. Pakistan has a continuing sense, with some reason for some Indian quarters, of being seen as an aberration, as an inherently flawed national project that is doomed to failure, an unviable national ideology which will eventually give way to a reincorporation into the bigger Indian neighbour, thereby restoring the unity of the Indian sub-continent, but on New Delhi's terms. After all, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP—Indian People's Party) 2004 manifesto was blunt in how 'the BJP unflinchingly holds that differences in faith cannot challenge the idea of India as One Nation or undermine our millennia-old identity as One People. This is why we rejected the two-nation theory on the basis of which our Motherland was tragically partitioned in 1947'.<sup>9</sup> India has the sense of

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Pakistan wanting to undermine her secular stability, to vindicate the two-nation theory of Hindu-Muslim divide, and to incorporate Muslim majority areas that are presently under the control of India. This, of course, takes us on to the issue of Kashmir, where intangible concerns and claims over national formation have created ongoing territorial dispute and military conflicts on a regular basis.

## Kashmir

Kashmir is the fulcrum on which intangible matters of national formation have developed into tangible matters of international conflict. In the months of Partition in 1947, generally Hindu-majority states went to India, and Muslim-majority states went to Pakistan. However, there were a few exceptions where local rulers did not reflect the religious identity of their states. In the case of Junagadh, a coastal enclave, its Muslim ruler, advised by his adviser Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the father of Pakistan's later Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, opted for Pakistan, but was swept away by a blockade, military intervention and successful plebiscite imposed by India. In the case of Hyderabad, totally surrounded by Indian territory, its Muslim ruler opted for independence before Indian troops intervened in September 1947.

In the case of Kashmir the lines went the other way, with a Hindu ruler sitting atop a Muslim majority population. Further ambiguity was caused by strong independence sentiments being muffled, and with the majority Muslim opinion being reflected not by Jinnah's Muslim League but by Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference that had co-operative links with the Congress Party. Suffice to say that amidst temporization by the Kashmir ruler, growing instability and appearance of irregular forces from the Pakistan side, followed by the decision of the ruler to call for Indian assistance, which in turn brought formal Pakistan intervention as well. The results were two-fold. One was the de facto partition of Kashmir between India-held central valley (Muslim-dominated) as well as Jammu (Hindu) and Ladakh (Buddhist), whilst Pakistan held onto the western fringes of Kashmir (renamed *Azad Kashmir*, 'Free Kashmir') and the northerly mountainous area of Baltistan. In the wake of military stalemate and recourse to the UN, vague promises were given on a plebiscite at some point, but this was shelved subsequently, as Sheikh Abdullah lent support to Kashmir's accession to India, and Pakistan strengthened its grip on Azad Kashmir/Baltistan.

Since then, conflict, 'unending war', has raged, with indeterminate outcomes merely entrenching divided outlooks between the two neighbours.<sup>10</sup> War in 1947–49 focused on Kashmir, whilst the wider conflicts in 1965 and 1971 brought in collateral fire in Kashmir. Within Kashmir the Kargil mini-war of 1999 was of course Kashmir-based, with the Siachin glacier proving another spot within Kashmir over which the two countries clashed. The Kargil dispute was the last time that the states employed their military forces directly against each other, but cross-fire along the Line of Control continues down to the present.

Post-Kargil, Kashmir has not disappeared as an issue.<sup>11</sup> Instead of state-to-state conflict, Kashmir has developed its sub-state and trans-state conflict dynamics as the growth of local operatives in Kashmir was given support by Pakistan. This is labelled by India as little more than Pakistan 'sponsoring' terrorism, a subject to which we can turn.

## Terrorism

A constant refrain from India is the country's sense of Pakistan being a state that sponsors 'terrorism'. Initially, this was associated with Pakistani support given to Kashmir and Sikh

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insurgents in the 1970s, part of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's strategy for forward strategic depth, an instrument to substitute for the lack of strategic depth and early warning capabilities of a Pakistan that had been truncated in two following the 1971 war with India. Internal Kashmir developments, including the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982 and harder-line coercive policies by Indira Gandhi, had sparked a growing insurgency in the valley of Kashmir in 1989. In Pakistan the political leadership, now headed by Benazir Bhutto, gave political support to the Kashmir cause, whilst the ISI gave material and substantial support to the insurgent groups, funnelling aid across the ceasefire Line of Control leading from Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir/Baltistan into the Indian-controlled valley of Kashmir.

The results were clear enough, growing identification and denunciation of Pakistan as a terrorist-sheltering state. Typical was India's Ministry of External Affairs *Annual Report 1998–1999*:

Our concerns regarding Pakistan's continued, and active involvement in instigating and sponsoring terrorism in J& K and other parts of India, were made clear to them on several occasions during the year – and reiterated during the composite dialogue, and conclusive evidence to this effect was also presented. It was emphasised that our resolve to defeat cross-border terrorism and to safeguard our security interests was total. We have advised them that abandonment of this activity, and full respect for their commitments under the Simla Agreement, including avoidance of provocative acts across the LOC and hostile propaganda, were essential steps.<sup>12</sup>

Such Pakistan-sponsored support for insurgency groups was further strengthened by the ending of the ISI-supported *mujahideen* groups that had been operating against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, such Afghanistan-conflict *mujahideen* veterans, based in Pakistan, turned their attentions eastwards to Kashmir. Instead of formal state–state war (as in 1947–49, 1965 and 1971), Kashmir was the scene for 'covert war' waged by *jihadi* groups aided and abetted by Pakistan's ISI.

However a further problem for India has been the readiness of such Pakistan-sponsored groups to take the fight to other parts of India. In 1993 'Pakistan's complicity in the planning and execution of the bomb blasts in Bombay resulted in an increased perception of the public in India of Pakistan's designs to interfere in India's internal affairs and to engineer conditions of instability'.<sup>13</sup> In 2001 it was the bombing of the Indian parliament, which brought large-scale 'near-war' mobilization of Indian forces along the border with Pakistan. It also brought detailed analysis by the Indian Government:

The abortive terrorist attack against Parliament on 13 December, by elements of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and JeM [Jaish-e-Muhammad], was undoubtedly the most audacious, as also the most alarming act of terrorism in the nearly two decades of Pak-sponsored terrorism in India. This time, the Pakistani-based terrorists and their mentors across the border had the temerity to try and wipe out the entire political leadership of India. Much thought and reflection have been given as to why Pakistan based terrorist groups and their mentors decided to raise the stakes so high [...] The only answer that satisfactorily addresses this query is that Pakistan – a product of the indefensible Two Nation Theory, a theocratic state with an extremely tenuous traditions of democracy – is unable to reconcile itself with the reality of a secular, democratic, self-confident and steadily progressing India, whose standing in the international community is getting inexorably higher with the passage of time.<sup>14</sup>

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What is striking is the rejection of Pakistan's very foundations, the two-nations theory, as being indefensible, not only then in Pakistan's 1947 formation, but also logically for its continuation in the 21st century. What is also noticeable is this sense of Pakistan dragging India down from its otherwise straightforward international rise.

In 2008 it was the Mumbai bombings again. India was clear on the Pakistani provenance of the attackers:

The more fragile a Government, the more it tends to act in an irresponsible fashion. Pakistan's responses to our various demarches on terrorist attacks is an obvious example [...] Those in charge of the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan have resorted to other stratagems to infiltrate terrorists into India. Infiltration is occurring via Nepal and from Bangladesh, though it has not totally ceased via the Line of Control in J&K. We are aware that the sea route is another option that is now being exercised. A few interceptions have taken place, though we failed to intercept the 10 Pakistani terrorists who came by sea from Karachi on November 26. The terrorist attack in Mumbai in November last year was clearly carried out by a Pakistan-based outfit, the Lashkar-e-Taiba. On the basis of the investigations carried out, including the Agencies of some foreign countries whose nationals were killed in the attack, there is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.<sup>15</sup>

Talk of 'some official agencies in Pakistan' is another word for the ISI. What is noticeable is India's sense of terrorist attacks circumventing India's military hold on Kashmir, through operating from Nepal and Bangladesh.

### **Strategic culture, the legacy of war and military arms race dynamics**

Amidst such ideological and territorial divides, Pakistan and India have come to blows several times. India may stress its *ahimsa* (non-violence) tradition, but it has been prepared to take the battle to Pakistan. With both claiming moral justification over their respective causes, and with both claiming to have fought defensive wars against each other, the fact remains that conflict has been endemic since independence in 1947. Just over a century has seen successive wars, namely full-scale conflicts in 1947–49, 1965 and 1971, the mini-war over Kargil in 1999, ongoing skirmishes over the inhospitable Siachin glacier, near-war in 2001–02 (*Operation Prakasham* mobilization), and cross-fire border incidents which are a continuing fact of life.<sup>16</sup> For each country, their most obvious military enemy has been the other; they have become used to thinking of the other as the military foe.

Pakistan has long sought strategic parity with India, with a sense of cultural élan compensating for numeric inferiority, the feeling that 'one Pakistani soldier is equal to 10 Indian soldiers'. India has long sought to establish superiority over Pakistan, militarily and diplomatically. Its *Cold Start* military doctrine, introduced in 2004, was 'aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific', involving rapid deployment forces able to strike into Pakistan and crush both the Pakistani Army and terrorist groups operating on Pakistani soil.<sup>17</sup>

Given such adversarial mindsets, there has also been an ongoing arms race competition, within which classic IR 'security dilemma' dynamics operate as each tries to match and cap the other, in a spiral of spending and mistrust. From Pakistan's point of view, it has long sought military equipment from more powerful allies to enable competition with India. Initially such arms transfers were mainly from the USA, but in more recent years the People's Republic of

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China has also provided Pakistan with ongoing military assistance. From India's point of view, its military links with the Soviet Union and later Russia have partly been aimed at redressing the imbalance with China, but have been aimed also at attaining/maintaining military superiority over Pakistan. Fighter aircraft have been one aspect of their arms race, with India keen in recent years to see that US arms sales to India are not matched by similar sales to Pakistan.<sup>18</sup>

Missiles have been another feature of this arms race and build-up. Pakistan's arsenal was steadily built up during 1989–2000 in terms of numbers and range. It consists of *Hatf-I* (60 km–80 km range), *Haft-II* (aka *Abdali*), *Hatf-III* (aka *Ghaznavi*, 290 km range), *Hatf-IV* (aka *Shaheen-I*, 750 km range), *Hatf-V* (aka *Ghauri*, 1,500 km range and payload capacity of 700 kg), *Ghauri-II* (2,300 km range), and *Hatf-VI* (2,500 km range). These are all India-centric in terms of range and purpose. Meanwhile, India's own missile programme has developed over the years, with its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) set up in 1983. This has led to *Prithvi-I* (150 km range), *Prithvi-II* (250 km range), *Prithvi-III* (aka *Dhanush*, 350 km range), *Agni-I* (700 km range), and *Agni-II* (2,000 km range). The *Prithvi* and *Agni-I* missiles are all Pakistan-centric, while the longer range of *Agni-II* gives it China- as well as Pakistan-centric purposes, with the subsequent longer range *Agni-III* missile being China-centric alone.

The increasing range but also increasing payload of Pakistani and Indian missiles has also been entwined with their nuclear weapons programme, which indeed provides the nuclear payload for such missiles. India's nuclear weapons programme was sparked by China's nuclear advances in the 1960s. The 1971 defeat with India, followed by India's own nuclear explosion in 1974 (Pokhran-I, *Operation Smiling Buddha*) was the spur for Pakistan to develop its own nuclear weapons programme, to try to re-establish military-strategic parity.

Such developments came to a head in 1998, when in April of that year Pakistan tested its most powerful missile to date, the *Hatf-V* (aka *Ghauri*) missile, with a 1,500 km range and payload capacity of 700 kg. India's response was immediate: the Pokhran-II, *Operation Shakti*, nuclear tests in May 1998, which were immediately matched by Pakistan's own nuclear tests, *Operation Chagai*, later in the month. Both sides have built up a small nuclear arsenal, with Pakistan spending proportionally more to try and match India's bigger economic capacity.<sup>19</sup>

India's logic at the time involved Pakistan. As Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to the US President pointed out:

I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state [China] on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust, that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours [Pakistan] to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour [Pakistan] we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last ten years we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it [Pakistan] in several parts of our country, specially Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>20</sup>

What, of course, is evident are the China-centric strands of the argument, as well as the reiteration of having to face ongoing military conflicts and sponsorship of terrorism against India by Pakistan. In addition, though Pakistan's close links with China were of concern to India, specifically with regard to the crucial Chinese help given to Pakistan's nuclear programme,<sup>21</sup> so was Pakistan's role as a proxy for China, as a surrogate state.

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## Pakistan links with China

One China-Pakistan irritant for India was the readiness of Pakistan to give up to China its claims to the Trans-Karakorum Tract (Shaksgam valley) in 1963. This was greeted with dismay by India, which of course claimed that the Shaksgam valley was part of India through India's wider claims to Kashmir. Further reports of Pakistan allowing entry of Chinese forces into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, in Gilgit and Baltistan, were of concern to India in the summer of 2010.<sup>22</sup>

In wider terms, one problem that India faces with Pakistan is that it may on its own have an undoubted power advantage over Pakistan, the hopes of maintaining any strategic parity with India of which disappeared after defeat in the 1971 war and the division of Pakistan. Pakistan's response to its diminishing power position *vis-à-vis* India has been to develop its own nuclear weapons programme (with the assistance of China) and to strengthen its foreign policy alignment with China in general. This so-called 'all-weather friendship' between Pakistan and China operates as a more sinister 'nexus' in Indian eyes, in which 'China thus operates as a "force multiplier" for Pakistan *vis-à-vis* India'.<sup>23</sup> New Delhi increasingly sees Pakistan as not so important in its own right, but as offering dangerous opportunities for China's attempt to encircle India, coming, as it were, down from the Himalayas, down the Indus to the Indian Ocean, in effect blocking India along its north-western flanks. China's links with Pakistan are also seen as threatening with the build-up of the deep water port of Gwadar, opened in 2008 with Chinese funding, and offering berthing potential for a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's links with China do constrain India to some extent. This did not stop India from military action in 1971 (Bangladesh) and 1999 (Kargil), but the dangers of facing a two-front war against Pakistan and China did stop India from taking military action against Pakistan in the wake of the Mumbai bombings of 2008.<sup>24</sup> Ironically, India's military planners did, in 2010, move towards accepting such a two-front war against Pakistan and China simultaneously.<sup>25</sup>

## Positive linkages?

So far, the relationship of India with Pakistan has been portrayed in generally negative terms. National ideologies, territorial disputes, terrorism, a military arms race, and differing diplomatic alignments (the Pakistan-China nexus) have generated entrenched ongoing friction and negative relations between Indian and Pakistan. International Relations (IR) *constructivism*, geopolitics and *realism*<sup>26</sup> power imperatives are all in play in such negative dynamics. However, are there any IR strands that can, or could, ease their situation? The IR *democracy = peace* framework would suggest one avenue for easing tensions. However, Pakistan's democracy has been fragile, often swept away by recurring bouts of military rule, or sidelined by the presence of the ISI.

The other main IR framework has been IR liberalism-functionalism, the idea of increasing economic trade across borders. There should indeed be 'security spill-overs' from economic cooperation between these two neighbours.<sup>27</sup> The only problem here is that Indian-Pakistani economic links have been so low as to be virtually non-existent. Infrastructure links are the exception rather than the rule, hence the fuss over Atal Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif re-establishing the Delhi-Lahore bus route in 1999. After the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, trade was almost negligible for a period of nine years. Bilateral trade did resume in 1975/76, following the 1974 protocol for the restoration of commercial relations on a government-to-government basis, signed by the two countries after the 1971 war, but it remained at an insignificant level till very recently. It stood around US \$150m. in 1992/93. Since 1996 trade between the two



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countries has been generally increasing, though subject to erratic variations reflecting political hiccups between the two countries, following India's granting of most favoured nation (MFN) status to Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, increased its list of permissible items to 600, adding another 78 items in 2003, and another 72 items in 2004. The latter year also saw the two countries signing the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Trade stood at \$180m. in 1996, but has been increasing in quantity terms to \$616m. in 2004/05, \$869m. in 2005/06, \$1,674m. in 2006/07, to reach a peak of \$2,239m. in 2007/08, before slipping back to \$1,810m. in 2008/09 (a decline of almost 20%, partly caused by the global recession but also by the post-Mumbai bombing deterioration in relations).<sup>28</sup> It remained down at \$1,849m. for 2009/10. From India's point of view, Pakistan is still an unimportant trade partner. Pakistan's share of India's total trade remained small at 0.24% in 2003/04, 0.32% in 2004/05, 0.34% in 2005/06, 0.54% in 2006/07, 0.54% in 2007/08, 0.37% in 2008/09 and 0.40% in 2009/10. Admittedly, illegal trade might push these figures up, but then illegal, unofficial trade is unlikely to improve official relations.

Indeed, some specific trade issues are problematic. Two important pipeline projects are the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) projects. Having crucial energy concerns vulnerable to Pakistan (turning the taps off, as it were), interruption is something that is pushing India to seek alternatives, i.e. establishing links from Afghanistan to Iran's port of Chabahar, rebuilt with Indian financial assistance, i.e. routing Turkmenistani oil via the International North South Corridor (INSC) route from the Caspian Sea down to Chabahar.

## Conclusions

Anyone speculating on Indian-Pakistani relations faces a quandary. The most tangible issue may be resolvable, perhaps with a status quo partition along the current Line of Control, with soft borders and decentralization of power away from India and Pakistan. Something on those lines seemed to have 'almost' been agreed in 2004, before the fall from power of Pervez Musharraf. However, ideologically they remain poles apart, with an inherent readiness to assume the worst of each other and to seek to constrain the other country, in the case of Pakistan with the help of China. IR *security dilemmas* continue to operate between these two neighbours. Trade will probably grow, though, as after all their remaining low level of trade means there is sizeable potential for increased trade.<sup>29</sup> However, India may well be focusing its economic interest elsewhere, eastwards to the Bay of Bengal (BIMSTEC), South-East Asia (ASEAN) and East Asia (EAS) frameworks.

Of course, the internal character of each state remains problematic. Pakistan faces two challenges: one is to avoid the 'Talibanization of Pakistan', the scenario whereby rising Islamists take control of Pakistan (and its nuclear forces) ready to unleash *jihadist* cadres against India in Kashmir and elsewhere.<sup>30</sup> This would be a nightmare scenario for New Delhi. The other challenge is surviving intact.<sup>31</sup> Some Indian commentators see Pakistan as an inherently flawed creation, and something that is either doomed to eventual re-absorption back into a still-rising India, undoing Partition as it were. An alternative variant is the disintegration of Pakistan into constituent Baluchi, Pashtun, Sindhi and Punjabi parts, smaller units that would be unable to pose such a challenge to India as Pakistan has. The example of 1971 lies before Pakistan and India, the eruption of Bengali nationalism generating the creation (with Indian help) of Bangladesh, thereby undercutting the whole logic of the two-nation theory and its underpinning of Pakistan's continuing existence. Meanwhile, what of India?

India faces some similar challenges. First, there could be a Hindu equivalent of the 'Talibanization of Pakistan', overturning the secular direction of post-Independence India. The

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possibility is there: the *Hindutva* forces restrained by Nehru's Congress Party did, after all, achieve power in 1998, under the BJP, the first act of which was to conduct nuclear tests at Pokhran-II, 'the Hindu bomb' as some called it. Though the BJP lost the 2004 and 2008 general elections, a return to power could see a *Hindutva* resurgence. The irony for Pakistan would be that this would echo Jinnah's own two-nation theory analysis of a Muslim India (Pakistan) and a Hindu India. Such a development would probably be detrimental to India-Pakistan relations. Second, India might fragment. This was the notorious suggestion by one Chinese think tank, an India fragmenting into 30 pieces.<sup>32</sup> Such fragmented post-India successor states would be unable to pose the existential threat to Pakistan in the structural way that the Republic of India has managed to do through its sheer size and numbers, almost 10:1.

## Notes

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